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I. Introduction
Both Cambodia and Vietnam have applied for membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). So far, ASEAN's six rnembereThailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines-have delayed consideration of the applications, because of the current state of economic and political development in the two nations. It is likely that both countries will eventually be allowed to join the groupand possibly sooner rather than later. When this takes place, each will have access to ASEAN's rapidly progressing economic and political integration, a condition that might create new economic opportunities. Regional gas and electricity supply networks are evolving in the ASEAN states. If development continues in Vietnam and Cambodia, each country might eventually become part of these systems, though at this point it is difficult to say whether their status would be that of a net supplier or buyer from such networks. The position would depend on future hydrocarbon discoveries and developments. Laos's electricity system is already integrated with Thailand's and thereby with ASEAN.
The Business Environment in Indochina
The three nations of Indochina want foreign investment and trade. The people and government of each nation realize that their economies have been left backward and their citizens poor by the protracted series of wars and internal conflicts that have characterized their area. This realization is emphasized to them by the relative economic success of neighboring territories such as the ASEAN states, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and even China, which have enjoyed economic and social progress while Indochina has remained isolated by the international embargoes that followed the Vietnam War. Each nation realizes that it has a good deal to learn before it can copy the success of such neighbors. The three countries also know that they have the important advantage of being able to provide relatively low cost labor at a location that is near to these centers of growth. Given the r r backward communications and transportation networks, Indochina is not necessarily low cost in areas other than labor.
Oil and gas exploration has been carried out in each nation of Indochina, though commercial quantities have been confirmed only in Vietnam. There has been much speculation that the Spratly Islands near Vietnam offer some of the more promising offshore oil exploration territory in the world. While such claims might be overstated, the islands are subject to continuing territorial disputes among China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and others. Each party has attempted to reinforce its claims through the establishment of military bases on the minute islands, and several have offered oil leases at least on the fringes of the area. Vietnam has generally argued that its position is supported by international agreements regarding offshore territories and has been willing to subject its claims to negotiation, provided its title to its continental shelf is not rejected.
The territorial debates over the Spratly Islands do affect the validity of some leases that Vietnam has issued to international oil companies. The offshore boundary between Cambodia and Vietnam is also an area of some hydrocarbon promise and unresolved territorial dispute.
Both Vietnam and Laos have coal deposits that have attracted commercial exploration and development, though neither has the preferred steam coal variety, bituminous, in large quantities. In Vietnam, most of the coal is anthracite while in Laos it is lignite.
The Mekong River, with its numerous tributaries, is the principal river of the region, but there are other sizable river systems, notably in northern and central Vietnam, These rivers are believed to have considerable potential for irrigation, transportation, and hydroelectric generation. Cooperation in the development of the Mekong River has been a long sought if ephemeral goal. The potential for hydroelectric development is limited by seasonal flow variations, by recurrent droughts, by watershed loss due to lumbering and deforestation, and by reluctance to inundate valuable agricultural lands.
Cambodia
General: Cambodia is barely a consumer of commercial energy. It is thus an "open" market for any party that might wish to supply the energy-starved domestic market.
Suppliers would, however, have to work with the government to find sources of fimding, including the means of recovering any foreign exchange that they expend.
Oil: Cambodia, like its neighbors in Indochina, is underexplored for oil and gas.
Developments in Cambodia have been handicapped by continued political instability and by civil and military insecurity. Nevertheless, exploration has continued. One firm, Premier Consolidated Oilfields, plugged and abandoned a well that tested at 1,180 barrels per day (b/d) of oil and 1.3 million cubic feet of gas per day. Another company, Enterprise Oil (UK), has claimed a well off Cambodia's south coast that yielded 4.7 million cubic feet per day of natural gas and 180 b/d of oil. Subsequent finds have also been announced. Such claims demonstrate the presence of hydrocarbons, but perhaps not yet at profitable levels. It would be a matter of interest to determine the extents to how much decisions to abandon sites were based, respectively, on geologic potential, on the difficulty of exporting any discovered reserves, and on Cambodia's continued internal disorders.
Oil consumption is estimated at 180,000 tonnes/year (about 3,600 b/d). This amount is probably supplemented by private imports fiom Thailand and Singapore. This volume is insignificant and could not support a domestic refining industry.
Gas: Cambodia has no natural gas production at present. Cambodia of course hopes that the increasing interest in hydrocarbon exploration will lead to the discovery of commercial quantities of gas. If commercial volumes are found, Cambodia would face a dilemma in determining whether the gas would be exported or consumed domestically.
Foreign explorers would prefer the hard cash derived fiom exports; Cambodia, when faced with the costs of exploiting the gas, might likewise prefer the foreign exchange.
Nearby Thailand currently would willingly consume any energy produced in the region, and at some distant time Vietnam might be willing to import energy from Cambodia as well. Expensive development would be required to make any discovered gas available to such neighboring markets.
Hydro: Cambodia has long been part of the evolving Mekong River projects that have sought to develop the river's energy and irrigation potential. The projects have been interrupted by war and politics but seem to be reviving. Electricity is generated almost exclusively for household use. Cambodia remains part of the still existing Mekong River project, which promises eventual electricity projects. In the development of electricity in neighboring Laos, Cambodia has nominally been included as a potential customer. Cambodia has arranged financial credit with the Asian Development Bank to enhance the technical skills of its electricity industry workers.
Renewables
In May 1994 a U.S. firm, Intercore, offered to alleviate Phnom Penh's electricity problems through the installation of a 105 MW gas turbine power station. The first 35 MW are to be completed by the end of 1995. The prospects for the remaining 70 MW are uncertain. Electricity plans are also progressing for other Cambodian towns. Cambodia lacks the financial resources to develop its electricity resources on its own, though several aid-giving agencies might be willing to provide further assistance. Without such assistance foreign independent power producers, who would be welcomed, might have difficulty locating sufficient foreign exchange to justifl sizable investments.
The possibility exists of exporting Cambodian generated electricity to Thailand or, just possibly, Vietnam. For such activity to take place, investors would require assurances of the security of their long distance transmission from civil and military disorders.
Laos
Oil and Gas: Laos has not been subjected to intense exploration for oil. During 1989-91 three agreements were made with foreign (including U.S.) consortia to conduct oil and gas exploration on tracts varying in size from 20,000 to 37,000 square kilometers. No significant finds have been announced to date, and Laos is still an oil importing nation.
Laos has no refinery. It is not clear whether any of these projects could start on schedule, and other projects are likely to be proposed. There has historically been considerable concern over the environmental impact of these projects, which has affected their design.
Environmental concerns are likely to shape future plans as well.
Renewables: In addition to its hydroelectric and lignite contracts with foreign governments, Laos has entered into timber contracts with foreign concerns. These contracts have been criticized on environmental grounds, but are continuing. It is not clear what the impact would be on the availability of fuel wood, the major household energy source in rural Laos. Fuel wood and other renewable resources are believed to supply around 90 percent of energy consumption in Laos.
Electricity: Electricit6 du Laos is the national utility. Laos is presently not a major consumer of electricity. Publicly provided services are available only in Vientiane and few other towns. Some border areas are provided with electricity from Thailand and Vietnam. Laos intends to become a major exporter of electricity using indigenous hydroelectric and lignite resources (see above). Laos already exports a large portion of domestically generated electricity to Thailand, and existing plans imply that Thailand's share of Lao-generated electricity might actually increase in coming years. Hydroelectric ambitions have been curtailed by drought due to loss of forest cover to lumber interests.
Laos and Thailand's utilities have also had ongoing differences over the appropriate price for electricity exports.
We do not see significant export markets for Laos's electricity elsewhere in the region, even though Vietnam's development ambitions imply that it, like Thailand, might develop an insatiable appetite for electricity. Our reasons for this conclusion, regarding Laos, are primarily based on doubts whether Vietnam will have the foreign capital to buy quantities of imported electricity for at least another decade or so. Indeed, recent agreements call for the limited export of Vietnamese generated electricity to Lao consumers. We expect that Laos might be a willing seller to any neighbor who can pay, if its domestic electricity requirements are also met. Thailand is the only such neighbor.
The Asian Development Bank and the Swiss are funding ($17 million) an electricity transmission project to connect the Nam Ngum power station with Luang Prabang. Laos's meager domestic consumption of electricity would be augmented by such plans, but for consumption to grow significantly in gross volumes, more generation activity would have to be devoted to domestic markets than is currently planned.
Percentage growth figures for electricity demand would be biased by Laos's small consumption base.
Vietnam
General: The lifting of the U.S. economic embargo on Vietnam in 1994 effectively ended Vietnam's economic and political isolation. Development had been taking place for several preceding years, after other international investors anticipated the U.S. move. U.S. f m s had also been laying the groundwork for the move as well and consequently did not suffer as much from the delay as they might have otherwise.
Oil: The World Bank has estimated Vietnam' potential oil reserves to be in the 4-6 billion barrel range, though proven reserves are closer to 2 billion barrels. The largest oil field, Bach Ho produced 130,000 b/d of oil in 1993, plus natural gas which is currently flared. Additional oil has been discovered at Dai Hung, which might be exploited by the end of the decade, though the site is considered difficult to exploit. Several other promising sites have been recently discovered, though they tend to be located in basement formations whose potential long term production is ambiguous. Recent exploration experience indicates that Vietnam is more "gas-prone" than "oil-prone," and some industry sources hold that Bach Ho will soon require $1 billion in investment to prolong its useful life. New fields might replace this production, but, barring continued discoveries, longer term plans must include the possibility of eventual oil imports late in the next decade. Areas of potential oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea are subject to territorial disputes with neighbors. Several offshore exploration and production leases have been let by Vietnam, but significant tracts remain available to interested firms. At least six American firms are there already.
Vietnam is forced to export most of its crude oil production and to import its refrned product requirements, since the nation has no significant oil refinery.' Several plans to build oil refineries have been announced. The frrst of these was a 130,000 b/d refinery to be managed by France's Total along with Taiwanese. It was to be located in the south near the most promising oil fields. Total and the Vietnamese government have disagreed over the refmery's exact location, and this project is now seen as in jeopardy.
This might imply opportunities for other investors in the south. If a second refinery is built, it is likely to be in the north. Presently, Vietnam consumes around 85,000 b/d of refined products. Oil consumption during 1985-91 grew approximately 9.5 percent per year, a trend that the World Bank expects to continue. Thus while planned refineries will have more capacity than current consumption, this is a condition that might not long continue, even if both are built. This goal is based partly on expected discoveries fiom its present exploration activities.
Officials estimate that 4-5 billion cubic meters per year of natural gas will be available by that time (roughly equal in energy to 270-330 million barrels of oil). In 1994 construction began on a 107 km gas pipeline fiom the offshore Bach Ho oil-gas field to the mainland. Further expansion of the line is expected during 1995-96. Gas fiom the field will be used to generate electricity in Ho Chi Minh City and Vung Tau, and 300,000 tonnedyear of LPG fiom the condensates should be available for exports. While power generation will consume most of Bach HO'S gas output, some gas might be allocated to industry, including ceramics and glass. Some natural gas reserves in Thai Binh Province in the north are currently also being exploited.
There are several potential natural gas fields in Vietnam, especially offshore.
These generally coincide with potential oil sites. Development of these reserves will require more clearly delineated government policies and pricing terms for investors.
Recent efforts to promote hydroelectric schemes will affect the potential to develop natural gas for electricity generation, one of the chief potential markets for gas. Gas fired electricity is likely to play a major role in Vietnam's domestic future energy mix, if fiuther gas fields are proven and developed. Gas developments will also depend on the ability to attract investors to fields that have relatively low potential to produce crude oil, which is more readily prepared and priced for export markets. Some companies are investigating the possibility of exporting gas to the rapidly growing l%ai market via connections to existing offshore Thai pipelines. Southern China is another potential market. The export of gas to northern Asia in the form of LNG is also being considered.
For any of these plans to develop, gas reserves will have to be specified with more Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand have participated in a sequence of Mekong River projects that have sought to jointly develop that river's resources. These plans have been frequently interrupted by wars and disagreements but appear to be coming back into existence.
Nuclear:
We know of no nuclear electricity generation plans in Vietnam. If Vietnam's ambitious development schemes bear fhit and as concepts of national prestige grow, we would not be surprised to hear of such ideas. Nuclear electricity is not cost effective in most cases, thus we doubt that much foreign financial support would be found or that such developments might take place soon.
Renewables: It is estimated that wood, bamboo, biomass, and rice straw provide around 60 percent of Vietnam's primary energy consumption. Such estimates are always approximations, but a share of such magnitude indicates considerable room for contributions from marketed energy. Vietnam has a national program to develop new and renewable energy sources, indicating receptivity to microhydro, solar, biogas, and wind energy projects. We do not expect these activities to make major contributions to the national energy picture, though they might meet local energy needs. This is expected to be sufficient to allow electricity production to grow by as much as 18 percent per year. There are also plans to build 5,000 km of high tension transmission lines, 77,500 km of medium tension lines, and 150,000 km of low tension lines. Goals target the installation of 13,000 transformers. These numbers are ambitious, though rapid growth in the electricity sector is as likely as growth in any energy sector of Vietnam.
Around fifty million of Vietnam's seventy million people do not receive electricity fiom the national grid. Present targets seek to meet the electric power needs of broad sections of the nation, with residential consumption growing most rapidly. Despite these intentions, we expect that Vietnam will instead follow the pattern of many other nations by allocating its scarce resources to industrial needs first. An early target is the interconnection of the northern, central, and southern regions into a single 500 kV transmission line. While this would initially allow northern hydroelectric and coal facilities to supply the south, natural gas fired plants in the south might eventually export electricity to the north. Any eventual result should be a product of the relative economic growth of the two regions. Transmission losses are estimated at around 25 percent, perhaps indicating the rather inadequate metering of electricity. It can be expected that Vietnam will seek foreign assistance in monitoring electricity use.
It seems likely that national electricity goals can be approached only with the participation of independent power producers. Recent plans have included such activities by Taiwanese and Australian firms. Many recently announced projects involve natural gas as the principal fuel. Other electricity projects have involved Japanese foreign aid. Petrochemicals: Vietnam is one of the largest countries of the world without a large domestic petrochemical industry. The meager state of the petrochemical industry is partly due to inadequate domestic resources to f h d such capital intensive activities. We expect that, if recent oil and gas discoveries come to h i t i o n and if initial indications that Vietnam has begun a period of rapid economic progress prove to be correct, this capital will be available soon. Plans to produce base petrochemicals (in this case, ammonia) involve the allocation of gas from the Bach Ho field to a fertilizer facility in the Mekong delta area. This project would also produce urea (500,000-600,000 tonnedyear).
Vietnam already produces 60,000 tonnes/year of urea at other sites. Some versions of the plan also imply the production of methanol from the gas, though the proposed facility would be small (20,000-30,000 tonnedyear). In 1994 four Japanese and Vietnamese f m s proposed building a 60,000 tonnedyear PVC plant in Ho Chi Minh City, which is scheduled to start in June 1997.
The production would replace PVC resins imported by the Japanese partners from Thailand. Elf Atochem has also considered PVC production in Vietnam. Also suggested for Vietnam is a small nylon-6,6 project led by Rh6ne-Poulenc and scheduled for completion during 1995. Purified terephthalic acid, polyester, and styrene monomer capacity have also been encouraged by the government, though no commercial plans have been announced. Such investments in derivatives often precede more extensive base and intermediate petrochemical investments. These particular projects might imply both aromatics and olefrn activities. We expect that a foreign partner would be sought before olefin activities are undertaken, and that such production is inevitable, perhaps in the distant future.
IV. Expected Industry Trends
With the assistance of a little luck, Indochina is well positioned to join Asia's recent record of impressive economic growth. Its leaders and people are aware of the success that is being achieved around them, and they are prepared to emulated it-to the extent that their social and political systems permit them. Vietnam, with the largest population among the three countries and its lengthy coast, seems poised to be the first nation in Indochina to succeed, even though it had a late start. This is also true even though Vietnam still has a government that seeks more strongly than do the governments of Laos or Cambodia to retain elements of the autocratic Communist past. The domestic issue for the government is, of course, how to meet recognized needs of the economic system without disrupting political power.
Vietnam and to a lesser extent Laos and Cambodia are well positioned to take advantage of future trends in energy and energy-related markets. Vietnam has commercial oil and gas reserves. Firms would not be exploring in Laos or Cambodia if they did not hope that those nations also had commercial hydrocarbon potentials. It remains to be seen whether reserves are sufficient to permit a hydrocarbon export industry to develop. There is particular optimism for gas in Vietnam, but if the economy develops on schedule or if reserves deplete as rapidly as is feared, known oil reserves might not be sufficient for long term domestic needs. Gas reserves will probably be found to be more abundant, and Vietnam's location might eventually permit eventual exports to either southern China or Thailand by pipeline. If such markets develop, LNG investments would make sense only if gas supplies are truly abundant relative to domestic needs.
Hydroelectric supplies alone are almost never sufficient to meet the needs of a developing country, though they can help. The share of hydroelectricity in local electricity supplies might grow for a while, as a result of large projects, but viable and truly vacant sites will decline in number with time. Hydropower is subject to seasonal variations that might not match consumption seasons, thus hydro usually has to be augmented by more conventional power. The ongoing development of regional power grids might accomplish this more effectively than siting conventional power plants in areas now served by hydro. Northern and central Vietnam might, for example, become hydroelectric producing areas, while the south (oil and gas) and north (anthracite coal) provide thermal power. It is perhaps too early to talk of base versus peak load needs in Vietnam, but the period when they become a concern might come soon, if economic development continues. Hydroelectric power might gradually evolve in such an environment into a peak load source. If economic success is achieved, Vietnam might also evolve into a net importer of electricity from neighboring nations.
Electricity is barely consumed in Laos and Cambodia, though Laos is poised to become a notable net exporter of hydroelectricity and lignite-fired electricity to Thailand.
This market is available to Cambodia, if it can identi@ a fuel. Laos is already providing some small communities with electricity purchased from Thailand and Vietnam.
Cambodia is still worried about supplying cities and towns. Consumers certainly want the modern life that electricity makes possible, and therefore interests in both Laos and Cambodia are bound to shift from the export of electricity to the provision of local supplies. Table 1 
